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Abstract 
Almost every network over the last 30 years is built on Spanning Tree Protocol (STP). This 
protocol makes topology information available to individual switches by exchanging Bridge 
Protocol Data Units (BPDUs) containing data fields which enable the Spanning Tree 
Algorithm (STA) to determine a hierarchy of switches on the network. A review of literature 
shows limited investigation into information leakage due to this protocol has been carried 
out since its first publication by the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC)  in 1985.   
 
Scripts were developed using the Python Programming language accepting information from 
STP Packets with the aim of identifying the network topology of a Local Area Network (LAN) 
as well as information leakage from STP. Mitigation techniques for any information leakage 
discovered are discussed.  
 
As a result of this project the viability of a security auditor using the developed scripts within 
a LAN in order to obtain a situation awareness of the network security perimeter of an 
organisation and assets within in this perimeter is also determined.  
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1. Introduction 
Since its emergence in 1985 (Perlman, 1985) practically every network and network switch 
has utilised Spanning Tree Protocol (STP), for loop avoidance and enabling redundancy in a 
mesh network  topology . It would be accurate to say that most enterprise networks in the 
world today use STP. When this protocol was initially developed network security was not as 
prevalent as it is today meaning that STP does not include the security features of a more 
recently developed protocol.   
Every organisation has valuable IT assets such as computers, networks and data. Protecting 
those assets requires the organisation to conduct IT security audits in order to get a clear 
picture of network security risks and how to best deal with the threats they pose (IT 
Security, 2007).  
 
In order to obtain an up-to-date situational awareness of the security perimeter and identify 
assets within that perimeter, security auditors have historically used open-source tools such 
as Nmap and Nessus (Webster, 2006). These tools use active monitoring techniques which 
inject test traffic onto a network and monitor its flow in order to identify network hosts 
(Sullivan, 2013). In their paper entitled, "Asset Tracking in Critical Power Communications 
Infrastructure using Passive Techniques" O'Raw et al. (2015) noted that active scans of this 
type could cause legacy equipment to crash, meaning that active scans are banned from 
certain critical infrastructure sites and alternative non-intrusive methods such as passive 
monitoring would be required in order to identify assets located within this type of network.   
 
Instead of injecting artificial traffic into the network, passive monitoring entails monitoring 
traffic that is already on the network. Either specialised probes designed to capture network 
data or built-in capabilities on switches or other network devices can be used to capture 
network packets for analysis (Sullivan, 2013).   
 
Previous studies have shown the use of various discovery protocols such as the Local Link 
Discovery Protocol (LLDP), Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) can be utilised along with the 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) in order to passively identify network 
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topology. SNMP is a Layer seven application OSI protocol which uses both management and 
agent software for network management in order to passively map network topology and 
carry out node characterisation, although It was noted that, “not all devices support SNMP” 
(Sans 2014, para. 30), which limits its effectiveness with regards to a networks which 
contain devices where SNMP is not supported. It could also be argued that the use of SNMP 
is not truly passive as its use requires the installation of agent and management software by 
a network administrator.  
 
The author intends to establish if the long-standing STP which provides path redundancy 
while preventing undesirable loops in a network can be utilised by a security auditor as an 
alternative to SNMP for passively mapping the topology and security perimeter of the 
network via an administrative PC connected to a single switch interface.  
 
"You can't protect assets simply by knowing what they are; you also have to understand 
how each individual asset is threatened"(IT Security 2007, para. 8). By passively monitoring 
the network the author also hopes to identify any vulnerability created by STP, while also 
providing mitigation techniques for a security professional.  
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1.1 Project Scope 
The scope of the project is to investigate: 
 
1. Information leakage by a passively monitored device using the standard IEEE 802.1D 
Spanning Tree Protocol(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers et al., 2004), 
while also illustrating  vulnerabilities which may be utilised by a would be attacker. 
 
2. Provision of a mitigation strategy for any vulnerability identified from information 
leakage.  
 
3. The validity of using the standard IEEE 802.1D Spanning Tree Protocol(Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers et al., 2004), to passively identify the network 
topology of a standard Local Area Network (LAN) by accessing a single switch interface 
located on the network ,while also  determining  if it can form the basis for a application 
which may be utilised by a security auditor for establishing  a network’s security 
perimeter.  
 
As well as using a protocol analyser to examine the spanning tree packets, an application 
will be created using Raw Sockets in order to automatically abstract information at the Data 
Link Layer which can help in identifying network topology. 
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2. Literature Review  
Within the Literature Review STP is examined and described with emphasis on 
understanding the exchange of information between devices and examining current 
academic literature with regards to the current state of thinking in relation to STP security. 
It was noted that Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been identified as the most prevalent 
vulnerability for STP with multiple methods for attacking the network being identified. Raw 
Sockets are used as a means by which an attacker can manipulate STP Packets in order to 
carry out a DoS attack, therefore a brief explanation with regards to Raw Sockets has also 
been given within this section. 
2.1 Spanning Tree Protocol 
The Spanning Tree Protocol was originally developed by Radia Perlman for the Digital 
Equipment Corporation (DEC) in 1983 (Menga, 2004) and was first published in 1985 
(Perlman, 1985) . The IEEE standard version of the protocol, 802.1D was published in 1990 
and was superseded by RSTP 802.1W in the 2004 version (Iveson, 2013). 
 
STP currently exists in the original Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) implementation and 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)  standard which was developed 
from the latter and is almost exclusively used in networks today (Menga, 2004). 
 
Prior to STP introduction any switch architecture which had a loop would end up with 
duplicate frames flooding between switches causing an outage; this is commonly referred to 
as a "broadcast storm".  The Spanning Tree algorithm(STA) solved the problems associated 
with this physical loop by creating a logical blocking solution by stopping normal switch 
forwarding (Bahethi, 2014). 
 
Once the root bridge has been selected, each non-root bridge determines the best path to 
reach the root bridge while blocking any other paths which introduce loops on the network.  
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In a converged STP, each port is either in a forwarding or blocking state. Ports which are 
considered the best path to the root bridge are placed into a forwarding state while all 
other ports are placed into a blocking state. 
 
On their first initialisation, each switch generates a unique bridge ID used by spanning tree 
to uniquely identify the bridge. The bridge ID is a combination of the bridge MAC address 
plus a 2-byte bridge priority field, where the priority field can be altered by a network 
administrator to directly affect whether or not a bridge becomes the root bridge. The switch 
with the lowest bridge ID is the root bridge. When the bridge ID has been determined, this 
bridge begins to generate configuration Bridge Protocol Data Units (BPDUs) assuming that is 
the root bridge (Menga, 2004). 
 
There are two types of BPDUs used in spanning tree, configuration BPDUs and Topology 
Change Notification (TCN) BPDUs. Configuration BPDUs are originated by the Root Bridge 
and flow outward along the active paths that radiate from the root bridge. TCN BPDUs flow 
upstream (towards the root bridge) to alert the root bridge that the active topology has 
changed (Rossi, 2000). 
2.1.1. Configuration BPDUs 
This type of BPDU is the main communication mechanism for STP and is used to determine 
the root bridge and whether or not a port should be forwarding or blocking state. The 
configuration BPDU has various fields which are used to indicate important parameters for 
the generation of the final STP by the  Spanning Tree Algorithm (STA) (Menga, 2004). 
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Figure 1 Configuration BPDU Parameters and Format(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers et al. 2004, p. 62) 
On receiving a configuration BPDU containing a lower root bridge ID, the bridge immediately 
considers this lower root bridge ID as the new root bridge and begins propagating the 
configuration BPDUs received from this bridge. Therefore in a network with multiple 
bridges, the bridge with the lowest bridge ID will eventually become the root bridge to all 
bridges.   
 
Configuration BPDUs are generated by the root bridge only. Configuration BPDUs for non-
root bridges are generated only when a configuration BPDU originated by the root bridge 
are received via the root port of the non-root bridge. The non-root bridge updates fields, 
such as root path cost, bridge ID and port ID in the received configuration BPDU and then 
propagates the updated configuration BPDU out all forwarding ports, except the root port 
upon which the BPDU was generated. This ensures that configuration BPDUs are propagated 
throughout the entire network. 
 
After the root bridge has been selected each non-root bridge attempts to build a topology 
that forms the lowest-cost path to the root bridge. The lower this cost the more preferable 
the link. Depending on bandwidth each logical port has a default cost associated with it, as 
defined in the IEEE standard. This cost can be modified to influence root port selection.  
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Figure 2 IEEE Default STP Costs(Menga 2004, para. 14) 
Every port within STP transitions through several states upon port initialisation. Data from 
the user is only forwarded when a port is in the forwarding state. This approach is taken to 
prevent any loops from forming even for a short period, as a broadcast storm can bring 
down a network in seconds. There are five spanning tree port states, which are as follows:  
1. Disabled State 
A port is disabled when the port is down. This may be because the port has been 
administratively shut down or because of some issue with processing BPDUs. A port 
transitions from this state to the blocking state moving immediately to a listening state after 
it is initialised at the Layer 2 level. 
2. Listening State 
This is the phase where most of the important groundwork of generating a loop-free 
topology is carried out. Within this phase, spanning tree goes through the following 
processes: 
i. Root Bridge Election 
The bridge with the lowest bridge ID is selected as the root bridge. 
ii.  Root Port Selection 
A single root port is selected from every non-root bridge providing the closest path to the 
root bridge.  
iii. Designated bridge (port) selection  for each segment 
Each switch determines whether or not it represents the shortest path to the root bridge for 
each network segment attached to the non-root switch this excludes the network segment 
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attached to the root port. If this is the case, it configures itself as the designated bridge for 
the segment and configures the port as a designated port. Designated ports are placed into 
a forwarding state, while all other non-designated ports are placed into a blocking state. An 
exception to this configuration is if a non-designated port represents the root port on 
another switch. If this is the case, the root port on the other switch remains in a forwarding 
state, as well as remaining the designated port on the local switch. 
Whether root bridge election or a root port selection, the same STA selection process is 
used for all decisions. Priority criteria are processed one by one, by comparing the 
configuration BPDUs received on a port with the configuration BPDUs that are sent out a 
port. 
 
Figure 3 Spanning Tree Algorithm(Menga 2004, para. 20) 
3. Learning State 
The bridge is accepting user data without forwarding it during the learning phase. The local 
MAC address table is populated on each bridge, so that once traffic is forwarded, the bridge 
does not need to flood a lot of traffic.  
4. Forwarding State 
Depending on whether a port has been selected as either a root port or designated port, it is 
placed into the forwarding state. A port will remain in a forwarding state until a topology 
change occurs, where the port transitions to the listening phase and performs the 
appropriate selection processes. 
 
5. Blocking State 
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Where a port is found not to represent the shortest path to the root bridge it is placed in 
the blocking state. This is where the port is being blocked from sending or receiving any user 
data while still sending and receiving configuration BPDUs.   
 
Figure 4 Spanning Tree Port States (Menga 2004, para. 15) 
Timers determine how quickly or slowly a spanning-tree topology can react to a link or 
bridge failure converging to a new topology. There are three spanning-tree timers which are 
as follows: 
1. Hello timer 
The Interval between the generation of each configuration BPDU. The default is two 
seconds. 
2. Max age timer 
This timer controls the validity of a configuration BPDU after being received. The default is 
20 seconds, meaning that if a configuration BPDU is not received within 20 seconds of the 
previous configuration BPDU, the previous configuration BPDU is no longer valid and a new 
root bridge must be selected. 
3. Forward delay 
This timer controls the amount of time spent by a bridge port in each of the listening and 
learning states before transitioning into a blocking to a forwarding state. 
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2.1.2. Topology Change Notification (TCN) BPDUs 
 
 
Figure 5 Topology Change Notification BPDU Parameters and Format(Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers et al. 2004, p. 63) 
A majority of BPDUs on a healthy network should be configuration BPDUs, although all 
bridged networks see at least a few of the second type of BPDU, the Topology Change 
Notification (TCN) BPDU. TCN BPDUs play a key role in handling changes in the active 
topology. 
The TCN BPDU is much simpler than the configuration BPDU consisting of only three fields. 
TCN BPDUs are identical to the first three fields of a configuration BPDU with the exception 
of a single bit in the type field, with the type field containing one of two  hexadecimal values 
0x00 (Binary: 0000 0000) indicating a configuration BPDU or 0x80 (Binary: 1000 0000)  
indicating a TCN BPDU. 
Configuration BPDUs are only originated by the root bridge, but a TCN BPDU will be 
generated by any switch in the network when either of two things happens: 
1. A port has gone into forwarding state 
2. A port has gone from forwarding or learning state into blocking state 
"While the TCN BPDU is important, it doesn't give the other switches a lot of detail.  The 
TCN doesn't say exactly what happened, just that something happened"(Bryant 2015, para. 
4). 
When a bridge receives the topology TCN it will send a Topology Change Acknowledgement 
(TCA) on its designated port towards the downstream switch. It will create a TCN itself and 
send it on its root port as well.(Molenaarin, 2014) 
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Figure 6 Topology Change Notification working towards the root bridge (Molenaarin 2014, para. 37) 
When the root bridge receives the TCN, the root will also respond with an 
acknowledgement, taking the form of a configuration BPDU with the topology change 
bit/flag set.  This indicates to all receiving bridges that the aging time for their MAC address 
tables should be changed from the default of 300 seconds/5 minutes to the forward delay 
spanning tree timer value (default 15 seconds).  
 
Figure 7 Topology Change Acknowledgement from Root Bridge(Molenaarin 2014, para. 42) 
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A Portfast enabled port changing STP state cannot result in the generation of a TCN BPDU. 
The most common usage of Portfast is when a single PC is connected directly to the bridge 
port, and since such a port going into forwarding state (or leaving it) doesn't impact STP 
operation, there's no need to alert the entire network about it.(Bryant, 2015) 
2.1.3. Recent Spanning Tree Developments  
The IEEE has published a number of new specifications relating to STP, which include both 
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) 802.1W and Multiple Spanning Tree (MST) 802.1S 
specifications. 
 
The RSTP specification is the most significant development for spanning tree in recent times. 
RSTP has depreciated the 802.1D standard and redefines the states that bridge ports can be 
in, as well as how bridges detect failure and the associated convergence time. RSTP aims to 
reduce convergence times and also includes standards-based implementations of PortFast, 
UplinkFast, and BackboneFast. 
 
The MST specification relates to how spanning tree interacts with topologies that include 
multiple Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs). Modes of operation can be defined on Cisco 
Catalyst switches, which determine how the switch maintains STP for multiple VLANs. The 
following lists the common STP modes of operation: 
 
1. Common Spanning Tree (CST) 802.1Q 
This standard dictated that a single spanning-tree instance should be used for multiple 
VLANs. The reason for defining CST is to ensure interoperability with non-802.1Q bridges, as 
all STP communication is sent untagged on the native VLAN.  By having only one spanning-
tree instance each switch CPU needs to deal only with a single STP instance, although this 
has the drawback of being unable to use implement load sharing. 
 
2. Cisco Per-VLAN spanning tree (PVST+) 
This is a proprietary standard developed by Cisco, which allows multiple STP instances to 
operate in a Layer 2 network, while also allowing load sharing. This standard operates a 
unique STP instance per VLAN. Although allowing the load sharing, the implementation is 
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flawed as a single STP instance is required for each VLAN, even if VLANs share the same STP 
topology. This has a detrimental effect on CPUs in network environments which could 
support hundreds or thousands of VLANs. 
 
3. Multiple Spanning Tree (MST) 
MST is a combination of both 802.1Q and PVST+. It allows the user to map a configurable 
number of VLANs to a single STP instance, meaning that all VLANs that share the same STP 
topology can be supported by just one STP instance. Load sharing is achieved by having 
multiple STP instances, but the number of STP instances that must be maintained on each 
switch can be matched to the number of different logical topologies required for the 
network to implement load sharing (Menga, 2004). 
2.2 Spanning Tree Security  
Although STP is widely used in switching networks today, it was not until recently that its 
security performance has been studied by researchers. (Yeung et al., 2006) 
Network Layer 2 protocols such as STP have traditionally been considered trusted, in part 
because the local area networks (LANs) that they support are under the physical control of 
an organisation within a contained area. As a result Layer 2 infrastructure is not usually 
monitored unless there are connectivity issues. However, this assumption has been 
invalidated with the rise of the use of Layer 2 protocols over wide areas such as 
Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs), with attacks focused on the data link layer becoming 
more feasible and with the rise in insider threats within an organisation. Traditional 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) which usually operate at layer 3 or above on the TCP/IP 
stack have limited capabilities in dealing with threats which may occur at Layer 2 (Marro 
Mario, 2003).   
In his paper entitled "Attacks at the Data Link Layer" Guillermo Marro Mario (2003) 
discusses characteristics of the STP/RSTP protocol which render it vulnerable to a Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks by individuals with physical access to a network. DoS attacks exploit 
weaknesses in protocols and services by exhausting resources, causing service disruption or 
Quality of Service (QoS) degradation. Its main goal is to affect availability of the targeted 
service. The characteristics identified in this paper included: 
 
 
14 
 
1. Lack of authentication in BPDU messages 
2. STP's slow convergence 
3. Root role not fully monitored  
4. More complex state machine in RSTP 
 
Within this paper the following Flooding and Topology engagement attacks were listed 
which could be implemented on the network as a result of the previously identified 
vulnerabilities:  
 
1. Flood of Configuration Message BPDUs with TC flag 
2. Flood of Topology Change Notification BPDUs 
3. Single-homed Root Role Claiming 
4. Dual-homed Root Role Claiming 
5. Internal Node Role Claiming 
6. Tree Segmentation 
 
In a paper entitled "Improving Network Infrastructure Security by Partitioning Networks 
Running Spanning Tree Protocol"  Yeung et al. (2006) , discusses the current ROOT Guard 
and BPDU Guard techniques which have been developed by Cisco and there successful 
prevention of  root role claiming attacks launched on a network. It was noted that these 
techniques don't stop all the attack vectors previously identified by Guillermo Marro Mario  
(2003).  
 
Yeung et al. (2006) propose mitigation for all attack vectors associated with STP security by 
utilising boundary switches to partition a STP network into a hierarchy of switching domains, 
a Network Infrastructure (NI) which connects network infrastructure and a Non-Network 
Infrastructure (NNI) which connects to network hosts. The partitioning hides the detail of 
STP operation among domains and successfully avoids all STP attacks launched from the 
non-network infrastructure.  
 
Rai et al. (2011) highlight the fact that Yeung et al.'s mitigation technique requires the 
implementation of specially designed switches, running a modified STP in a paper entitled, " 
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Exploit Detection Techniques for STP using Distributed IDS", while also proposing their own 
mitigation technique which introduces a cover based distributed Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) installed on network switches strategically placed on STP domains which 
enable the detection of all possible attacks on STP. It is stated that experimental results 
show that all possible attacks can be detected through this proposed scheme (Rai et al., 
2011). 
 
 In their paper entitled "Trust-Based Security for the Spanning Tree Protocol", Lai et al. 
(2014) noted a number of deficiencies in Rai et al.'s design ; firstly it is noted that this design 
could not identify root take-over attacks launched from the inside network, secondly it was 
noted that a new switch that connected to a peer switch and claimed to be the root role 
would be falsely considered an attacker and finally it was noted that the IDS deployment 
used also needed to be changed as the network topology changes.  
 
Lai et al. (2014, p.1338), "propose a trust-based spanning tree protocol aiming at achieving a 
higher credibility of LAN switch with a simple and lightweight authentication mechanism." 
The authors concluded that their technique gave "comprehensive protection to the threats 
from both outside and inside the switches"(Lai et al. 2014, p.1343), with experiments 
showing that their improved protocol could effectively avoid the root take-over attack, 
flooding attacks, and other attacks. 
2.3 Raw Sockets   
Data passes from one device to another by descending the TCP/IP stack on the originating 
machine and ascending the stack on the receiving machine. The complexity of this process is 
hidden from programmers in order to simplify the development of network capable 
software by sockets. 
 
"A socket is a connection from one device to another. It can be viewed as a ‘pipe’ that is 
plugged into both devices. Data is put into the ‘pipe’ at one end and arrives at the other end 
without the programmers needing to consider how this is actually achieved" (Menzies 2002, 
p. 5).Socket end points are defined as exclusive combinations of port number and network 
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address, making it is possible for a machine with a single network address to host several 
connections by via different port numbers.  
 
Cooked sockets are where the data processing necessary to support the underlying network 
protocols is performed by the operating system. They greatly reduce the effort required to 
write network applications and are generally used by most application programmers.  
 
"A raw socket is a socket that  takes packets, bypasses the normal TCP/IP processing and 
sends them to the application that wants them" (Alder 2002, para.2). Where an application 
needs to programmatically control the details of the TCP and/or IP layers a programmer 
needs to be able both read and write the TCP and IP header information utilising raw 
sockets.  
 
When using a raw socket the operating system does not perform the processing necessary 
to maintain the TCP and IP headers, these details are determined by the program that is 
making use of the raw socket. This introduces a higher level of complexity for the 
programmer and requires detailed knowledge of the protocols used, while also requiring 
much more code to be written. But it also provides a very high degree of flexibility as each 
packet can be crafted exactly as the developer desires (Menzies, 2002). 
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3. Test Environment  
The Test Environment required for this project is strictly based on virtual devices composed 
of virtual machines running different Linux Operating Systems using the open -source Oracle 
VM Virtualbox Graphical User Interface Version 4.3.24r98716. The project uses both CentOS 
6.6 Minimal Install (kernel 2.6.32-504.8.1.e16x86_64) and Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Operating 
Systems (kernel 3.8.0-44-generic i686) with both being used within an internal network and 
connected to the internet using a single Network Address Translation (NAT) Interface for 
machine updates and downloading any applications and files which may be required. The 
host machine used for the project has a Microsoft Windows 7 Professional Operating 
System Version 6.1.7601 Service Pack1 Build 7601 with 8073 MB RAM installed.  
 
Figure 8 Initial Test Network Logical Diagram 
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3.1. Oracle VM VirtualBox 
A virtualisation hypervisor comes in one of two forms: a bare-metal hypervisor or hosted 
hypervisor, also known as Type1 and Type 2.  
Currently the most popular bare-metal Type 1 virtualisation hypervisors are: 
1. VMware ESX and ESXi 
2. Microsoft Hyper-V 
3. Citrix Systems XenServer (Siebert 2011, para. 5) 
 
 
Figure 9 Type 1 Bare-metal Hypervisor(Ribeiro 2009, para. 7) 
 
Currently the most popular hosted Type 2 virtualisation hypervisors are: 
1. VMware Workstation, Server, Player and Fusion 
2. Oracle VM VirtualBox 
3. Microsoft Virtual PC 
4. Parallels Desktop (Siebert 2011, para. 8) 
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Figure 10 Type 2 Hosted Hypervisor(Ribeiro 2009, para. 8) 
 
 
Figure 11 Test Network Devices Set Up in Oracle VM VirtualBox 
For this project the open-source Oracle VM VirtualBox hypervisor is used to create the 
internal network for the development and testing of application software for the 
identification of a network topology using the STP.  
VirtualBox was initially developed and released by Innotek GmbH in January 2007; Sun 
Microsystems acquired Innotek in February 2008, with the Oracle Corporation acquiring Sun 
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Microsystems in January 2010 and re-branding the product as "Oracle VM 
VirtualBox"(Tripathi, 2013). 
The Oracle VM VirtualBox application installs on the host computer, extending its 
capabilities so that it can run multiple operating systems via virtual machines at the same 
time. Multiple virtual machines can be installed and run with the only practical limitations 
being the disk space and memory of the host machine. 
Although Virtualbox supports up to eight network adapters. When a user looks into the 
*.vbox file for the virtual machine they will see that eight network adapters have already 
been preconfigured but disabled. Inside the VirtualBox GUI the user is only able to configure 
up to four network adapters. In order for a user to configure the remaining network 
adapters the command line interface for VirtualBox , VBoxManage.exe  is required (Neubert, 
2013). 
In order to set the path for VBoxManage.exe on the Windows host machine, the location of 
VBoxManage.exe file was found on the VirtualBox installation folder, located at C:\Program 
Files\Oracle\VirtualBox (Ang, 2012). Commands are available depending on the mode 
required for the network adapter(Neubert, 2013) (see Appendix A).  
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Figure 12 Eight Adapters shown in the *.vbox file for Switch1 
 
Figure 13  Using VBoxmanage commands using the Windows Host's cmd 
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3.2. Wireshark  
Wireshark was developed as a tool for tracking down network problems and learning more 
about networking. It was originally named Ethereal and was initially released in July 1998, 
being re-named Wireshark in 2006.  
Wireshark is an open source network packet analyser which attempts to capture network 
packets and display detailed packet data. Wireshark can be used for the following: 
1. troubleshooting network problems 
2. examining security problems 
3. debugging protocol implementations 
4. as a learning aid for network protocol internals(Lamping et al., 2014) 
 
It is important to note that while network analysis can be used to improve network 
performance and security it can also be used for malicious tasks. For example if password 
and username information were unencrypted it could be captured by a malicious user in 
order to compromise accounts. By learning network configuration information and listening 
to the traffic on the network an intruder can also exploit network vulnerabilities. Also 
malicious programs may include network analysis capabilities in order to sniff traffic on the 
network. 
 
For these reasons companies should define specific policies regarding the use of a network 
analyser by stating, who can use it on the network and the" how, when and where" it may 
be used. These policies should be well known throughout the company. When using a 
consultant for performing network analysis services, a company should add a "network 
analysis" clause to any non-disclosure agreement they may have (Chappell, 2010). 
 
For this project Wireshark was installed on each of the virtual Ubuntu PCs. STP packets 
generated by the virtual CentOS Switches on the virtual network were analysed using the 
Wireshark application. It is important to note that in order for Wireshark to capture and 
display packet information it must be run with root privileges.  
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3.3. Pycharm  
Unlike Eclipse which is generally recognised as the industrial standard tool for Java 
Development, no equivalent tool could be identified with regards to Python. Peer reviews of 
Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) for Python, indicate that PyCharm compares 
very favourably with the other python IDEs currently available to developers. While IDEs 
such as PyScripter and Exedore are platform dependant or others such as Komodo and 
WingIDE are commercial applications, Pycharm is both platform independent and available 
as an open-source application. Also unlike PyDev which is an Eclipse plugin PyCharm is a 
standalone application which simplifies its initial installation and use for python code 
development.  
The beta version of the PyCharm was released in July 2010 by the Czech company 
JetBrains(Taft, 2010) . PyCharm is available as both a Professional Proprietary Edition and an 
open source Community Edition which was released under the Apache License on 22 
October 2013.(Jemerov, 2013) 
For this project the Pycharm IDE Community Edition was installed on each of the virtual 
Ubuntu PCs. Pycharm was used to develop the python application for the project using raw 
sockets in order to access STP packets with the aim of establishing network topology. It is 
important to note that in order for Pycharm to create a raw socket and capture and display 
packet information, it must be run with root privileges. 
Python was first created by Guido von Rossum in February 1991 while working for Centrum 
Wiskunde and Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam, Netherlands. It is named after the Brit-com 
Monty Python's Flying Circus. "Many of Python's features originated from an interpreted 
language called ABC"(University of Michigan 1997, para. 1) which was also developed at 
CWI.  It has since been developed by a large team of volunteers and is freely available from 
the Python Software Foundation(Lukaszewski, 2015). 
 
"Python is an interpreted, interactive, object-oriented programming language. It 
incorporates modules, exceptions, dynamic typing, very high level dynamic data types, and 
classes "(University of Michigan 1997, para. 3). There are two recommended production-
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ready versions of python at this point in time, because at the moment there are two 
branches of stable releases: 2.x and 3.x.  
 
Python 2.7 has been used as the programming language for this project as there is currently 
more third party software available for Python 2 than for Python 3. It is important to note 
that Python 2 code will generally not run unchanged in Python 3. 
3.4. SSH/OpenSSH/Putty 
Tatu Ylönen, a researcher at Helsinki University of Technology, Finland, designed the first 
version of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol (SSH1) prompted by a password-sniffing attack on 
the university network. The protocol's goal was to replace the earlier rlogin, TELNET and rsh 
protocols, which did not provide strong authentication nor guarantee confidentiality. The 
first implementation of SSH was released as freeware in July 1995.  
In December 1995, Ylönen founded SSH Communications Security (SCS) to market and 
develop SSH. The original version of the SSH software used various pieces of free software, 
such as GNU libgmp, but later versions released by SSH Communications Security evolved 
into increasingly proprietary software. The "SSH Secure Shell" (SSH2) was released by SCS  as 
a commercial product in 1998 containing significant improvements in security, performance, 
and portability from the original protocol , although its  license has been broadened to 
permit  free use to the Linux, NetBSD, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD operating systems since its 
initial release.(Barrett, 2005) 
OpenSSH provides the same functionality as SSH2 without conflicting with any intellectual 
property restrictions(Chapple, 2005). OpenSSH was created by the OpenBSD team as an 
alternative to the original SSH software developed by Tatu Ylönen. OpenSSH first appeared 
in OpenBSD 2.6 and the first portable release was made in October 1999. 
PuTTY was developed by Simon Tatham and was initially released in November 1998 
(Tatham, 2011) , and it has been a usable SSH2 client since October 2000. While OpenSSH is 
probably the most used implementation of SSH in the world, PuTTY is likely the most used 
SSH client for the Microsoft Windows platform. Like OpenSSH, PuTTY is a very versatile tool 
for remote access to another computer.  
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 Apart from being a SSH Client PuTTY also supports all the following protocols: 
1. raw: The raw protocol is normally used for network debugging. 
2. rlogin: This is an unencrypted UNIX remote login protocol that uses port 513 by default. 
3. serial: The serial option is used to connect to a serial line. The most common purpose for 
this is to establish a serial connection between computers in lieu of an Ethernet or other 
network connection. 
4. SSH: As already noted, SSH is an encrypted secure remote login protocol, which uses 
port 22 by default. 
5. Telnet: Like rlogin, Telnet (telecommunication network) is an unencrypted remote login 
protocol. It typically uses port 23 and is available on many systems other than UNIX. Like 
rlogin, Telnet has waned in popularity due to privacy concerns. 
In addition to these five protocols, PuTTY also supports features such as saved session 
configurations, session logging, locale (language) settings, and proxy sessions (Perrin, 2008). 
3.5. Public Key Authentication  
 
Figure 14 Initial login without public key authentication 
Unlike conventional password authentication where an individual is authenticated by 
providing the correct password, public key authentication is an alternative more secure and 
flexible means of identifying oneself to a switch. 
For public key authentication key pair is generated, consisting of a public key (known to 
everyone) and a private key (kept secret). The private key is able to generate signatures. 
Signatures created using the private key cannot be forged by anybody who does not have 
the private key; but anybody who has the public key can verify that a particular signature is 
genuine. 
Therefore when a key pair is generated on computer and the public key is copied to the 
switch, when the switch asks for the SSH client to authenticate itself, the SSH client can 
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generate a signature using its private key. The switch can verify that signature and allow the 
SSH client to log in. 
A problem with this is that if a private key is stored unprotected on SSH client machine, then 
anybody who gains access to that machine will be able to generate signatures as if they 
were the SSH client . In order to eliminate this problem the private key is usually encrypted 
when it is stored on a local machine, using a passphrase of client's choice. In order to 
generate a signature, the SSH client must decrypt the key, by typing the passphrase. 
This makes public-key authentication less convenient than password authentication as every 
time switch is accessed, instead of typing a short password a longer passphrase is required.  
The solution to this is use an authentication agent, a separate program which holds 
decrypted private keys and generates signatures on request. PuTTY's authentication agent is 
called Pageant.  
When the user begins a Windows or Linux session, Pageant is started and private key is 
loaded into it by typing the passphrase once. For the rest of the session, PuTTY can be 
started any number of times and Pageant will automatically generate signatures. When the 
Windows or Linux session is closed, Pageant shuts down, without ever having stored the 
decrypted private key on disk.  
Currently the most commonly used public-key algorithm available is RSA which was 
invented by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. Another algorithm which may be 
used for public key encryption is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which is a Federal 
Information Processing Standard (Tatham, 2007). 
For this project a SSH password-less automatic login from all Test_PCs to Switches (see 
Appendix B). Where a single switch can easily be accessed using OpenSSH through the 
terminal, PuTTY proved particularly useful for accessing  and saving multiple sessions to the 
various switches on the network. 
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Figure 15 Putty Set-Up 
3.6. Linux Switch Set-Up  
A bridge is used to connect two Ethernet segments together in a protocol independent way, 
while a switch is a multi-port bridge connecting more than two Ethernet segments together. 
Unlike a router, bridges and switches forward packets based on Ethernet addresses, rather 
than IP addresses, meaning that all protocols can go transparently through a bridge. Within 
this paper the term “switch” or “bridge” may be interchangeable in their use when 
describing a single device used in order to connect Ethernet segments on the network. 
Bridge Control (BRCTL) implements a subset of the ANSI/IEEE 802.1D standard and was 
initially introduced in Linux 2.2. It should be noted that the code for bridging has now been 
integrated into 2.4 and 2.6 kernel series.  
Possible future enhancements for BRCTL include: 
1. Document STP filtering 
2. Netlink interface to control bridges (prototype in 2.6.18) 
3. STP should be in user space 
4. Support RSTP 802.1W and other 802.1D STP extensions(The Linux Foundation, 2009) 
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BRCTL is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the Ethernet bridge configuration in the Linux 
Kernel. To utilise the BRCTL function the user must be running as root or under sudo 
privileges.  
The procedure used in order to setup a switch on the network using BRCTL is detailed in 
Appendix C. Before starting it was important to make sure all network interfaces are set up 
and working properly. The IP addresses for the switches need to be set after the switch has 
been configured, with no IP addresses being set for the individual interfaces. Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) start-up scripts should also be disabled for each interface.  
Linux has a powerful tool which can mirror traffic known as the traffic control 
subsystem."Since it's a generic framework, its capabilities (including mirroring) are not 
limited to bridges; this means traffic can be  mirrored  for any interface(s) and sent  to 
another interface(s), regardless of whether they are physical, virtual, part of a bridge or not" 
(Backreference.org 2014, para. 29 ). A mirrored port was also added to each switch in order 
for Test PCs to obtain STP packet information from all of the switch adapters which is also 
detailed as part of the switch setup in Appendix C.   
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4. Spanning Tree Protocol Analysis  
For the purpose of STP analysis the internal network topology is gradually added to, initially 
containing a single switch and branching out into multiple switches on this network.  This 
was done in order to gain a clear understanding of the protocol itself and in order to identify 
signatures which may identify network topology.  
After the test network had been created STP packets were retrieved and analysed with the 
aid of Wireshark and Microsoft Excel.  Within Microsoft Excel the VLOOKUP function 
(French, 2015) was initially used in order to make the retrieved packet information more 
readable by displaying the device name, port numbers and flags as plain text relative to the 
hexadecimal values obtained using the packet analyser. 
Please note that as the first three bytes of a MAC Address (which is 08:00:27 in the case of 
the test network) are used as an Organisational Unique Identifier (OUI) for network 
interfaces and the final three bytes have been used in the results and diagrams to identify 
interfaces on the internal test network.         
 
Figure 16 VLOOKUP used to lookup hexadecimal information received by packet analyser 
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4.1. Single Switch Set-up 
Based on the information obtained with regards STP a single switch should transition 
directly from its initial blocking state through both listening and learning states within 30 
seconds depending if the default forward delay value is being used, all ports should then be 
placed in a forwarding state sending user data to and from the various nodes contained on 
the network.  The root ID and bridge ID of each configuration BPDU should be equal and the 
BPDU Cost value should be zero as this is the root switch on the network. After all switch 
ports have transitioned into the forwarding state, configuration BPDUs propagated from the 
root switch should indicate a change of network topology by having their topology change 
bit/flag set.  
On the preliminary set up of Switch1, a number of the switch ports were incorrectly 
connected to the same LAN segment. It was noted on start-up that within 0.0000224 
seconds Switch1 continued forwarding packets from the interface 1 only (04:1a:20), which is 
the lowest interface MAC address on this device. The original 802.1D Spanning Tree 
Specification had anticipated the possibility of the root bridge having more than one port on 
the same LAN segment, and in that case, the port with the lowest port ID would become the 
designated port for that LAN segment, and put into forwarding mode sending traffic away 
from the root, while its other ports on that same LAN segment became non-designated 
ports put were immediately put into blocking state  (Solie, 2002). 
When the virtual network topology had been corrected and a SPAN/mirrored/monitor port 
had been created (Backreference.org, 2014) , packets were once again retrieved from a 
single switch running on the network. This was done for each switch separately to ensure 
that there could be a correlation between the results obtained.  
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Figure 17 Single Switch Set-Up  
It was noted that each switch immediately started to send configuration BPDUs through all 
ports on start-up although after a period of approx 30 seconds (listening and learning States 
= 2 x forward delay) ,with the switches ports entering the forwarding state the topology 
change bit/flag was set on all the configuration BPDUs from the root switch for the next 35 
seconds  ,a default combination of max age and forward delay, which originates from the 
root switch and normally signals a topology change situation and to all switches on the 
network allowing them to reduce their MAC table aging time to forward delay (Cisco.com, 
2005). 
Once the initial listening and learning states and TCA from the each switch had been 
completed, each switch continued to send configuration BPDUs through all designated 
ports.  
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Figure 18 If you look at the topology change timer we see where the 34Secs, our timer here starts at 34.98Secs (max age 
+ forward delay) 
4.2. Two Switch Set-up 
The next stage of the project involved connecting two switches, Switch1 and Switch2 on the 
network.  Results were obtained by connecting PC1 to a mirrored port on Switch1, using PC2 
as a man in the middle with two of this machines interfaces set up as a transparent bridge 
using BRCTL (Harris, 2014) and by connecting PC3 to the mirrored port on Switch2.  
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Figure 19 Two Switch Set-Up  
The first test involved allowing Switch1 to bypass the initial start-up as described in 3.1 
above. Once the switch started to consistently send configuration BPDUs from its 
designated ports, Switch2 was powered on. It should be noted that the priority value for all 
switches have been left at the default value of 32768, meaning that the root switch will be 
determined by the lowest MAC address of the switches used on the network (Switch1 in this 
instance). Based on previous studies Switch1 should be forwarding configuration BPDUs 
which are received by Switch2 via its root port. Configuration BPDUs then forwarded from 
Switch2 should have updated bridge ID, Cost and port ID fields. When Switch2 passes 
through both the listening and learning states a TCN will be forwarded via its root port to 
the root Switch (Switch1) indicating that this switch has entered a forwarding state and 
there is change in the network topology. On receiving the TCN Switch1 sets the topology 
change bit/flag in all configuration BPDUs it generates to indicate its attached network 
segments that there has been a change in network topology.   
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Figure 20 Configuration BPDU  (University of Virginia 2015, p. 14) 
When looking at the information obtained from the three monitoring devices placed on the 
network, the following was noted: 
1. It took 28.09895 seconds for Switch2 to send a TCN  to Switch1 after packets started to 
be received using the packet analyser, this would indicate that Switch2 moved through 
both listening and learning states before forwarding BPDUs. 
2. The root ID for all BPDUs has a value 32768/ 0 / 08:00:27:04:1a:20 indicating that 
Switch1 is the root Switch on this network, while also showing that the priority value is 
set to the default.  
3. The root path cost is zero for a single interface at port id 0x8001 on Switch2 while all 
other interfaces have a cost of 4; this lower cost indicates that this port is the root port 
of Switch2. This port's bridge ID (32768 / 0 /08:00:27:04:1a:20) also confirms that 
Switch2 is receiving configuration BPDU's sent from Switch1 via this port, with all other 
interfaces forwarding updated configuration  BPDUs to other network segments. 
4. The source MAC address for the TCN was 57:3c:3a. It was noted from both mirrored 
ports on the Switches that the first configuration BPDUs with the topology change 
bit/flag set were broadcast via the designated port on which the TCN was received.    
5. After receiving the TCN the root bridge broadcast configuration BPDUs with the 
topology change flag set for a duration of 33.00006 seconds.   
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The second test involved allowing Switch2 to bypass the initial start-up as described in 3.1 
above. Once the switch started to consistently send configuration BPDUs from its 
designated ports, Switch1 was powered on. This test indicates what happens when a new 
root switch is placed on the network.  
When looking at the information obtained from the three monitoring devices placed on the 
network, the following was noted: 
1. When a new root switch was placed on the network there was no TCNs generated, this 
topology change is relayed to the network switches via the topology change bit/flag 
being set on the configuration BPDUs.  
2. The root id and cost of all designated ports change when Switch2 receives a 
configuration BPDU via its root port from Switch1, with both root id and bridge id 
changing for the root port receiving configuration BPDUs sent from the root switch.  
3. 28.27418 seconds after Switch2 receives its first configuration BPDU from Switch1, 
Switch1 commences to send configuration BPDUs with the topology change bit/flag set 
for duration of 33.999865 seconds.  
Note: As the transparent bridge (PC2) used for the Two Switch Set-up did not provide any 
extra information with regards to the exchange of BPDUs it was decided that it would not be 
used for the remainder of testing. 
4.3. Three Switch Set-up 
Stage three of the project involved connecting three switches Switch1, Switch2 and Switch3 
on the network. Results were obtained by connecting PC1 to a mirrored port on Switch1, 
connecting PC3 to a mirrored port on Switch2 and finally connecting PC4 to a mirrored port 
on Switch3. 
 This set-up adds redundancy while introducing also loops to the network. Although each 
test varies slightly the final network topology will not differ after the network has converged 
using the STA.  As the priority value has not been set, the hierarchy of switches on the 
network is determined using their MAC address.  Switch1 is the root switch as it has the 
lowest root ID. As both Switch2 and Switch3 have equal root path cost fields, the designated 
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bridge for Test_Network3 is established by comparing these switches bridge IDs. Switch3 
has a lower bridge ID therefore it becomes the designated bridge for Test_Network3, while 
the interface which connects Test_Network3 to Switch2 transitions into a blocking state still 
receiving configuration BPDUs from Switch3’s designated port.  
 
Figure 21 Three Switch Set-Up 
This first test involved allowing Switch1 and Switch2 to bypass their initial start-up as 
described in 3.2 above. Once both switches started to consistently forward configuration 
BPDUs from their designated ports, Switch3 was powered on.  
When looking at the information obtained from the three monitoring devices placed on the 
network, the following was noted: 
1. Switch1 remains the root switch with the lowest bridge ID(04:1a:20)  on the network 
2. Two TCNs were received by Switch1 , the first TCN from 57:3C:3a and  reply from 
04:1a:20 indicated the port connected to Test_Network3  had transitioned from a 
forwarding  into a blocking state ,the second TCN from 7a:aa:35 and reply  from 
e3:15:33 indicated that the designated ports on Switch3 had moved into a forwarding 
state from start-up (Cisco.com, 2005).  As a result these topology changes two root ports 
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(57:3c:3a,7a:aa:35) and designated ports (04:1a:20,e3:15:33) have been identified  on 
the network. This was also verified by tracing each TCN back to Switch1 and Switch3.  
3. Prior to sending a TCN, Switch2 started to receive configuration BPDU's from Switch3's   
network interface (9b:fc:27)  , while the fb:4d:4d interface on Switch2 stopped sending 
configuration BPDUs. From the above information the network segment between 
Switch2 (fb:4d:4d)and Switch3(9b:fc:27) has now been identified. 
This second test involved allowing Switch1 and Switch3 to bypass their initial start-up phase. 
Once both switches started to consistently forward configuration BPDUs from their 
designated ports, Switch2 was powered on.  
When looking at the information obtained from the three monitoring devices placed on the 
network, the following was noted: 
1. One TCN was received by Switch1 from Switch2 on its transition to a forwarding state. 
This identifies the network segment between Switch1 designated port (04:1a:20) and 
Switch2 root port (57:3c:3a).  
2. Switch2 is receiving two configuration BPDUs, one from Switch1 the root switch and the 
second from Switch3 (port relating to the non-designated/blocking port for Switch2) 
When two BPDUs are received on a switch because of redundant links in the network, 
the one with the higher root path cost is logically disabled and placed in a blocked state 
(Frazier, 2007) . Although this does not give the specific interfaces for each network 
segment it does give an indication of the network topology.    
 
This third test involved allowing Switch2 and Switch3 to bypass their initial start-up phase. 
Once both switches started to consistently forward configuration BPDUs from their 
designated ports, Switch1 was powered on.  
When looking at the information obtained from the three monitoring devices placed on the 
network, the following was noted: 
1. The first packet sent out by Switch1 was a configuration packet without the topology 
change bit/flag set. 
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2. The topology bit/flag was set for a period of 59.99961 Seconds instead of the default 35 
seconds  
3. No TCN is was received by the root switch (Switch1) 
4. A TCN was sent from Switch2 indicating that port 9b:fc:27 has changed from a 
forwarding port with a root path cost of 0  into a blocking port with a cost of 4. 57:3c:3a 
is now receiving configuration BPDUs from Switch1 with this port now becoming the 
root port 04:1a:20.  
5. Switch3 does not generate any TCNs although there is a change in its ports root path 
cost from 0 to 4 apart from its root port  
6. Switch3 received two configuration BPDUs from Switch1, the first was sent directly from 
Switch1 via e3:15:33 with a root path cost of 0 and the second was sent via Switch2 
fb:4d:4d with a root path cost of 4. Switch3 continues to receive BPDUs from Switch1 
but only receives this single configuration BPDU from Switch1 via Switch2. The ports on 
Switch3 do not change their state therefore no TCN is generated as its ports do not 
change any of their states to blocking.  
4.4. Four Switch Set-up 
Stage four of the project involved connecting four switches Switch1, Switch2, Switch3 and 
Switch4 on the network. This set-up introduces a peripheral switch which is connected to 
one of the core switches on the network. This test should provide a clear indication of how 
TCNs are propagated towards the root switch via the non-root switches root port, as well as 
showing TCAs sent from a non-root switch which is receiving a TCN via its designated port.     
Results were obtained by connecting PC1 to a mirrored port on Switch1, connecting PC3 to a 
mirrored port on Switch2, connecting PC4 to a mirrored port on Switch3 and connecting PC5 
to a mirrored port on Switch4.  
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Figure 22 Four Switch Set-Up 
This test involved allowing Switch1, Switch2 and Switch3 to bypass their initial start-up as 
described in 3.3 above. Once theses switches started to consistently forward configuration 
BPDUs from their designated ports, Switch4 was powered on.  
When looking at the information obtained from the three monitoring devices placed on the 
network, the following was noted: 
1. One TCN was received from Switch2 by the root switch (i.e. Switch1). 
2. Two TCNs were noted on Switch2 , one TCN was received by Switch2 from Switch4 and 
the second TCN was sent directly after receiving the first TCN from Switch2 to the root 
Switch 
3. Switch3 did not receive of send any TCNs, although it was notified by a change in the 
network topology by the root switch   
4. Switch4 receives configuration BPDUs from Switch3 via port 7d:07:76 with  a cost of 4 
and forwards configuration BPDUs with a cost of 8.  The root sends BPDUs with the root 
path cost equal to 0, and this cost keeps increasing as the network diameter increases 
(Frazier, 2007).  
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5. Script Development  
The Script Development section details the how script which uses the python programming 
language was developed in accordance with signatures obtained from the previous 
Spanning Tree Protocol Analysis section. The script was run on multiple PCs within the 
internal test network in order to determine if network topology could be fully identified. 
Although this is simple script to be used by a network administrator or security auditor, the 
code itself has been divided into object orientated classes making it more readable.  
5.1. Code Development  
 
  
 # used to create raw socket 
    def raw_Socket(self): 
        try: 
            self.s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.ntohs(0x0003)) 
            # Bind socket to internal network interface 
            interface = 'eth' 
            num = input('please enter interface number') 
            print ('You have selected interface no.' + str(num) + '\n') 
            # concatenate number to interface string 
            interface += str(num) 
            self.s.bind((interface, 0)) 
            # Place the interface into promiscuous mode on the virtual machine as well as on 
VirtualBox Hypervisor 
            os.system('ifconfig ' + interface + ' promisc') 
        except socket.error, msg: 
            print ('Socket could not be created. Error Code : ' + str(msg[0]) + ' Message ' + msg[1]) 
            sys.exit() Code Listing 1 Raw Socket Creation (Moon, 2011) 
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When developing the script for identifying information from Spanning Tree Protocol Packets 
the Raw_Socket Class contains a raw_ Socket function which will create a raw socket on a 
Linux based operating system. Within Code Listing 1, code has been added to allow the user 
to pick the network interface to which the raw socket is bound while also placing the 
selected interface into promiscuous mode, allowing the user to view all traffic on the 
network. If a socket is unable to be created an error message is displayed and the program 
shuts down.  
 
# create Raw_Socket 
                            r.raw_Socket() 
                            #Use CTRL+C to exit loop 
                            print 'Use CTRL+C to exit...' 
                            time.sleep(2) 
                            try: 
                                while True: 
                                    # retrieve packets from all available ports 
                                    packet = r.s.recvfrom(65565) 
                                    # packet string from tuple 
                                    packet = packet[0] 
                                    # parse ethernet header 
                                    e = Ether(packet[0:17]) 
                                    # If an Spanning Tree Protocol or Topology Change Notification is received 
determined by length 
                                    if e.eth_protocol == 9728 or e.eth_protocol == 1792: 
                                    # parse bpdu's to integer and string values 
                                        b = Bpdu(packet[17:52]) 
Code Listing 2 Raw Socket used in Runner (Python Software Foundation, 2015) 
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Code Listing 2 relates to the STP_Sniff_Runner Class which is the main method, henceforth 
referred to as "Runner".  This code shows that after the raw socket has been created 
packets are sniffed from all ports with each packet converted from a string to a read only list 
of characters, with the first seventeen characters relating to the Ethernet header of the 
packet. The ethertype value is parsed to an integer value by creating an Ether object using 
the Ether Class and if the integer values obtained relate to either a standard Spanning Tree 
Packet or a TCN ethertype the program continues to parse the remainder of the STP or TCN 
using the Bpdu Class.  
 
 
 
   # used to return ethernet header fields 
     def rtn_Header(self): 
         return ' Time ' + str(datetime.datetime.now().time())+' Destination MAC : ' + 
Conversion.toHex(self.dst_addr) + ' Source MAC : ' + Conversion.toHex(self.src_addr) + ' 
Protocol : ' + str(self.eth_protocol) + ' length : ' + str(self.length) 
    # used to return local link control 
     def rtn_llc(self): 
        # print local link data 
         return ' Local Link : ' + Conversion.toHex(self.local_link_control) 
     # static method used to convert string to hex 
    @staticmethod 
    def toHex(value): 
        lst = [] 
        for ch in value: 
            hv = hex(ord(ch)).replace('0x', '') 
            if len(hv) == 1: 
                hv = '0'+hv 
            lst.append(hv) 
 
        return reduce(lambda x,y:x+y, lst) 
 
Code Listing 3 Functions returning parsed Ethernet Header and Local Link information  
Code Listing 4 Static toHex function used to parse from string to hex value (Kharechko, 2006) 
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Code Listing 3 shows two functions taken from the Ether Class which return information 
with regards to the Ethernet Header and Local Link Control of the packet to the Ether 
Object, 'e' in Code Listing 2 created in the Runner which can then be printed to screen. A 
timestamp have been added each packet to make it uniquely identifiable. The Conversion 
Class is used for the first time here in order to convert parsed strings into hexadecimal 
strings. This method is static meaning that it can be called directly from the class using the 
class name.  
 
 
Code Listing 5 shows the print Packet function which print BPDU information of the BPDU 
Object, 'b' in Code Listing 2 created in the Runner to screen.  
 
 
Code Listing 6  Shows the how Code Listing 3 and 4 are used within the Runner print STP 
packet information to Screen, which is  choice 1"Sniff Spanning Tree Packets" in the Runner 
menu. 
# print packet data 
 print '\n' + str(count) + e.rtn_Header() +'\n\n'+e.rtn_llc()+'\n' 
# print all bpdu  Fields 
b.print_Packet() 
    #print bpdu fields to screen 
    def print_Packet(self): 
 print ' Protocol ID : ' + hex(self.protocol_ID) + ' Version ID : ' + hex(self.version_ID) + ' 
Bpdu Type : ' + hex(self.bpdu_Type) + ' Flag : ' + hex(self.flag) + ' Root Bridge Priority Value : ' 
+str(self.root_priority) +' Root Bridge Mac : ' + Conversion.toHex(self.root_Id) + ' Root Path Cost 
: ' + hex(self.root_Path_Cost)+'\n Bridge Priority Value :'+str(self.bridge_priority)+ ' Bridge 
Identifier Mac: ' + Conversion.toHex(self.bridge_Id) + ' Port ID : ' + hex(self.port_ID) + ' Message 
Age : ' + hex(self.message_Age) + ' Maximum Age : ' + hex( self.maximum_Age) + ' Hello Time : ' + 
hex(self.hello_Time) + ' Forward Delay: ' + hex(self.forward_delay) 
Code Listing 5Function used to print Bpdu Fields to Screen 
Code Listing 6 Printing STP Packet Data to Screen 
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Figure 23 Sample of Data obtained using the choice 1 in the application to Sniff Spanning Tree Packet
45 
 
Within the Runner, choice 2 of the menu enables the user to "Identify Network Switches 
and Topology" from the previous results identified in Section 4 Spanning Tree Analysis, using 
a number of if statements.  
 
 
 
 
Code Listing 7 is used to establish the root switch on the network while also identifying its 
designated ports. The OUI Class is used for the first time to identify a switch's Organisational 
Unique Identifier (OUI), the static method used is shown in Code Listing 8. The netaddr 
module(Moss, 2015) was imported into python in order to find the OUI for each noted MAC 
address  which is then  also printed to screen.  
# static method used to look up organisation unique identifier 
    @staticmethod 
    def oui_Lookup(macValue): 
       inter = EUI(macValue) 
       oui=inter.oui 
       return  oui.registration().org 
                                        # if current root is not the same as the previous bridge idand we don't have 
a tcn packet 0x80 
                                        if base[0] != b.root_Id and b.bpdu_Type != 128: 
                                            # base value for comparison with next packet 
                                            mac_Value = b.root_Id 
                                            # if this Mac is not list of interfaces 
                                            if mac_Value not in device: 
                                                # append it to the list 
                                                device.append(mac_Value) 
                                                print 'Root Bridge ' + ' ' + 
OUI.oui_Lookup(Conversion.toHex(mac_Value))+ ' ' + Conversion.toHex(mac_Value) 
                                                print 'Designated Port Interface ' + 
str(Conversion.toHex(packet[9:12])) 
Code Listing 7 Code to used to identify the Root Bridge 
Code Listing 8 OUI Static Method 
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Code Listing 9 is used to establish the multiple switches on the network while also 
identifying their designated port. A local "bridgeid_hex_form" variable using the current 
bridge ID is created in order to identify if there is a blocked port on the switch being 
monitored, this is due to both priority and MAC being required in order to establish our 
hierarchy of bridges.   
# if the current bridge is not the same as the previous bridge and we don't have a tcn packet 
                                        if base[1] != b.bridge_Id and b.bpdu_Type != 128: 
                                            # Create Mac item for comparison with other Macs added to the list of 
devices 
                                            mac_Value = b.bridge_Id 
                                            # Create bridgeid item for comparison with other bridgeid's added to the 
dictionary of costs and devices 
                                            # this is used in to identify a non-designated/blocked port 
                                            bridgeid_hex_form = str(Conversion.toHex(packet[34:42])) 
                                            if mac_Value not in device: 
                                                # append it to the list 
                                                device.append(mac_Value) 
                                                # increment the device count 
                                                device_Count += 1 
                                                print 'Bridge ID ' + str(device_Count) + ' ' + 
OUI.oui_Lookup(Conversion.toHex(mac_Value))+ ' ' + Conversion.toHex(mac_Value) 
                                                print 'Designated Port Interface ' + 
str(Conversion.toHex(packet[9:12])) 
Code Listing 9 Identifying Bridges on the Network 
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Code Listing 10 is used to identify a blocked/non-designated port searching a dictionary of 
root path costs and bridge identifier, if the root path cost is found in the dictionary and its 
associated bridge identifier is lower than the current bridge ID then the current bridge ID 
has a blocked port receiving packets from the stored bridge identifier and vice-versa. The 
root path cost and bridge ID dictionary is updated if a new bridge is detected and its MAC 
address has not already been stored is detected.  
# if there is an equal root path cost and lower bridge_identifier we know that this device has a 
blocked port 
                                                if b.root_Path_Cost in dic: 
                                                    #find the bridge id value associated with the cost 
                                                    br = dic[b.root_Path_Cost] 
                                                    if br < bridgeid_hex_form: 
                                                        
print'******************************************************************************************
****************' 
                                                        print '\nATTENTION-' + bridgeid_hex_form + ' has a non-
designated/blocked port receiving packets from ' + br+'\n' 
                                                        
print'******************************************************************************************
****************' 
                                                    else: 
                                                        
print'******************************************************************************************
*****************' 
                                                        print'\nATTENTION- ' + br + ' has a non-designated/blocked port 
receiving packets from ' + bridgeid_hex_form +'\n' 
                                                        
print'******************************************************************************************
*****************' 
                            
 
Code Listing 10 Identification of a blocked/non-designated port 
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Code Listing 11 identifies multiple forwarding ports associated with a single bridge ID. If the 
previous bridge ID is different from the current bridge ID and if the current bridge ID has 
already been identified then port IDs are used in order to establish if this bridge has more 
than one designated port.  If the ports IDs differ then the port ID is appended to a list of port 
IDs associated with the bridge ID and information with regards to the interface is printed to 
screen. This updated information is then stored in a dictionary of bridge ID and associated 
list of port IDs.  
        # find other forwarding ports associated with a bridge id 
                                        if mac_Value == b.bridge_Id and b.bpdu_Type != 128: 
                                            if b.bridge_Id in br_pid: 
                                                # if this port id is not in the dictionary list of port id's associated with 
the bridge id key value 
                                                if b.port_ID not in br_pid[b.bridge_Id]: 
                                                    br_pid[b.bridge_Id].append(b.port_ID) 
                                                    print 'Designated Port Interface ' + 
str(Conversion.toHex(packet[9:12])) 
                                        # creates and updates dictionary of bridge id's and port id's 
                                        br_pid.setdefault(b.bridge_Id, [b.port_ID])                     
 
Code Listing 11 identifying other forwarding ports in the switch 
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Code Listing 12 identifies network segments including root and designated ports on the 
monitored machine by using both TCNs and TCAs. The code checks the list of variables 
stored from the previous packet to identify if a TCN was sent and checks if a TCA has been 
received in the current packet. If this is the case then the current source address is 
combined with the previous root or bridge ID and compared with a list of previously 
identified segments in order to stop duplication. If the identified segment is not contained 
within the list of previously identified segments then information with regards to the 
segment is printed to screen and the segment information is appended to the list of known 
network segments.  
# the segment is identified by topology change acknowledgment (i.e the source mac address) 
after a topology change notification 
                                        if base[2] == 128 and b.flag == 129: 
                                            src_addr = Conversion.toHex(e.src_addr) 
                                            combined_segment_Values = src_addr + base[3] 
                                            #stop duplication of segments 
                                            if combined_segment_Values not in seg: 
                                                print 'This is a network segment : Root Port ' + base[3] + ' to 
Designated Port ' + Conversion.toHex(e.src_addr) 
                                                # append this know segment to list of segments 
                                                seg.append(combined_segment_Values)  
 
Code Listing 12 Identification of network segment using Single TCN and TCA 
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Code Listing 13 identifies Root ports from a monitored device and switches connected to 
the monitored using multiple TCNs. The code checks a list of variables stored from the 
previous packet to check if a TCN sent or received and compares with the current packet to 
check if it is also a TCN. If this is the case then combines the source address of the current 
packet with source address of the previous packet and compares with the list of combined 
segment values. If this combined value is not stored within the list of combined segment 
values then ports to and from the monitored device are printed to screen and the combined 
value is appended to the list of known network segments/roots.  
  
# if there is two tcn's in a row we know that the first tcn is the root port of a device connected to 
the monitored device and the second tcn is the root port of the monitored device 
                                        if base[2] == 128 and b.bpdu_Type == 128: 
                                            src_addr = Conversion.toHex(e.src_addr) 
                                            combined_segment_Values = src_addr + base[3] 
                                            #stop duplication of segments 
                                            if combined_segment_Values not in seg: 
                                                print 'Root Port connected to this device from Interface ' + base[3] 
                                                print 'Root Port from this device from Interface ' + src_addr 
                                                # append this know segment to list of segments 
                                                seg.append(combined_segment_Values) 
Code Listing 13 Identification of Root Ports using multiple TCNs 
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5.2. Application Testing  
This section is divided into two sub sections in order to identify what information is 
obtained on a network which is stable without any TCNs being generated and with another 
network which is unstable and generating TCNs and TCAs.   
5.2.1. Test Network without TCNs and TCAs 
The first test used the four-switch network topology set-up detailed in Section 4 Spanning 
Tree Analysis to identify what information could be obtained using the developed test script 
on a Stable Network (see Appendix D). From this a table of information with regards to 
network topology information was obtained and a logical diagram drawn from the 
information given. 
Within the stable network Switch1 is the root bridge as a result of having the lowest root ID 
on the network, propagating configuration BPDUs via its designated ports. Switch3 is the 
designated bridge for Test_Network3 as it is equal in root path cost but has a lower bridge 
ID than Switch2. Switch3 is receiving configuration BPDUs via its root port and forwarding 
updated configuration BPDUs via its remaining designated ports. In addition to receiving 
configuration BPDUs via its root port Switch2 is also receiving configuration BPDUs from the 
designated bridge (Switch3) for Test_Newtork3 via a blocked port while also forwarding 
updated configuration BPDUs to Switch4 via one of its remaining designated ports. In turn 
Switch4 updates both cost and bridge ID values in the configuration BPDUs received from 
Switch2 via its root port and forwards these updated BPDUs via its designated ports.    
By using the developed test script network devices, designated ports and the blocked port 
of the converged network can be identified. It should be noted that no root ports are 
identified on the stable network due to the absence of TCNs on this type of network.   
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Table 1 Application Test Results for a Stable Network 
 
Figure 24 Topology Information obtained from Table1 
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5.2.2. Test network with TCNs and TCAs 
The second set of tests is also carried out on the four-switch set-up network topology 
described in Section 4 Spanning Tree Analysis but are  carried out on an Unstable Network 
where TCNs and TCAs are being generated. There are a total of six tests shown where a port 
is going up or down, with the aim of generating TCNs which occur when a port/interface is 
transitioning into forwarding state or from forwarding or learning state into a blocking state 
(see Appendix E). From these tests a table of information with regards to network topology 
was obtained and a logical diagram drawn from the information given. 
Test one indicates what information can be obtained by administratively placing the root 
port (7a:aa:35) of Switch3 into a disabled state. Switch1 remains the root bridge 
propagating configuration BPDUs throughout the network. Switch2's blocked port 
transitions from a blocked state into a forwarding state as it becomes the designated bridge 
for Test_Network3. As Switch3 is not longer the designated bridge for Test_Network3 and is 
no longer directly connected to the root bridge (Switch1), its designated port (9b:fc:27) to 
Test_Network3 now becomes the root port for this switch. Configuration BPDU's are now 
received by Switch3 via Switch2, meaning that configuration BPDUs forwarded from Switch3 
now have and  updated root path cost  field which reflects this change in network topology. 
The script successfully identifies Test_Network1 (04:1a:20 to 57:3c:3a) as a TCN is generated 
by Switch2 as a result of its blocked port transitioning from a blocking into a forwarding 
state. Switch2's previously blocked interface (fb:4d:4d)  is identified, as it becomes the 
designated port for Test_Network3.Finally, Switch3's new root port (9b:fc:27) is also 
identified as  configuration BPDUs now being received via this port from Switch2.  
Test two indicates what information can be obtained by administratively placing Switch3's 
previously disabled port (7a:aa:35) back into a forwarding state. This port once again 
becomes Switch3's root port, receiving configuration BPDUs directly from the root bridge 
(Switch1) resulting in a change in the root path cost field of the configuration BPDUs 
forwarded from Switch3.  Switch2 is no longer the designated bridge for Test_Network3 
resulting in the designated port (fb:4d:4d) connected to this network segment being placed 
back into a blocking state and Switch3's interface(9b:fc:27) returning to the forwarding state 
as it once again becomes the designated port for this network segment.  
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The script successfully identifies Test_Network2 (e3:15:33 to 7a:aa:35) as a TCN is generated 
by Switch3 as a result of its disabled port transitioning back into a forwarding state.  
Test three indicates what information can be obtained by administratively placing Switch2's 
root port (57:3c:3a) into a disabled state. Switch1 remains the root bridge propagating 
configuration BPDUs throughout the network. Switch2's blocked port (fb:4d:4d) becomes its 
root port with configuration BPDUs forwarded by this switch having an updated root path 
cost to reflect the change in network topology. There is no change with regards to Switch3 
which continues to forward configuration BPDUs via its designated ports.  
The script successfully identifies Test_Network3 (9b:fc:27 to fb:4d:4d) as a result of a TCN 
being generated when Switch2's port (fb:4d:4d) transitions from a blocked state into a 
forwarding state becoming the root port for this switch. The peripheral switch (Switch4) has 
a lower  MAC address than Switch2 and as a result of bridge priority being left as the default 
value, it assumes it is the root bridge when Switch2's root port (57:3c:3a) is initially disabled 
prior to receiving configuration BPDUs from the actual root bridge (Switch1) via 
Switch3(9b:fc:27) and Switch2(7d:07:76). Switch4's root port and designated port 
(16:48:1a), as it is both receiving and sending information to the root bridge (Switch1) is 
identified. Switch4's root port(16:48:1a) was identified as a result of a TCN being generated 
when this switch transitions from a blocked state into a forwarding state after it initialises 
the STA when it assumes that it is the root bridge.     
Test four indicates what information can be obtained by administratively placing Switch2's 
initial root port (57:3c:3a) back into a forwarding state. Switch1 remains the root bridge 
propagating configuration BPDUs throughout the network. There will be no change with 
regards to Switch3 which continues to forward configuration BPDUs via its designated ports. 
As Switch2's root port reverts back to the it interface (57:3c:3a) which is directly connected 
to the root bridge, interface fb:4d:4d once again enters a blocked state receiving 
configuration BPDUs from the root bridge via Switch3(9b:fc:27). 
There is no duplicated information obtained as a result of Switch2's interface (57:3c:3a) 
transitioning from a disabled state back into a forwarding state and generating a TCN which 
would identify Test_Network1 when using the test script.  
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Test five indicates what information can be obtained by administratively placing the 
designated port (9b:fc:27) of Switch3 into a disabled state.  Switch1 remains the root bridge 
propagating configuration BPDUs throughout the network. Switch2's blocked port (fb:4d:4d) 
transitions into a forwarding state as now becomes the designated port for Test_Network3.  
There is no duplicated information obtained as a result of Switch2's blocked interface 
(fd:4d:4d) transitioning from a blocked into a forwarding state becoming the designated 
port for Test_Network3 and generating a TCN which would identify Test_Network1 when 
using the test script.  
Test six indicates what information can be obtained by administratively placing the disabled 
port (9b:fc:27) of Switch3 into a forwarding state. Switch1 remains the root bridge 
propagating configuration BPDUs throughout the network.Switch2's designated port 
(fb:4d:4d) for Test_Network3 transitions from a forwarding to a blocked state, as Switch3 
once again becomes the designated bridge for Test_Network3.  
There is no duplicated information obtained as a result of Switch3's disabled port (9b:fc:27) 
transitioning from a disabled into a forwarding state which would generate a TCN  indicating 
Test_Network2 or as a result of Switch2's designated port (fb:4d:4d) transitioning from a 
forwarding into a blocking state which would generate a TCN indicating Test_Network1 
when using the script.  
By carrying out these tests the entire topology of the test network was established, 
although it was noted that this was achieved by combining the information obtained by 
concurrently running the tests scripts on all four administrative PCs on the test network. As 
data relating to individual network segments was not duplicated by using the developed 
python script the process of establishing the test network topology was greatly simplified.  
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Table 2 Information obtained from unstable network 
 
Figure 25 Topology Information obtained from Table2 
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6. Recommendations /Conclusions 
This section is broken into three sub sections with the first two sections relating to the 
project scope identified at the beginning of the dissertation and the final section detailing 
what the author believes is the next logical step as a result of the works carried out within 
this dissertation.    
6.1. Information Leakage and Mitigation  
Developed 30 years ago and having a number of DoS attacks vectors identified as detailed in 
Section 2 Literature Review, STP does not appear to provide a large amount of data leakage 
which could prove advantageous to a would be attacker.  
Having said this, depending on how many TCNs are generated and whether default priority 
values are contained within the root ID and bridge ID BPDU STP fields. One could assume 
what level of administration is being used on the targeted network. For example, if there is 
a large number of TCNs and the default priority values are used for STP then an attacker 
may view this as indicating a lack of administration present on the network; therefore 
indicating a possibility that devices contained within the network may have been installed 
without changes to their default administrative values. This combined with the 
"Organisation Unique Identifier" information contained within in the first three bytes of a 
layer two MAC address which provides information with regards to the device vendor which 
could provide the attacker with enough information allowing them to access and control a 
switch on the network.  This would allow an attacker to change the priority value on the 
controlled switch making it the root bridge in STP and giving further MAC address 
information relating to network nodes contained within the controlled switches'' MAC 
address table. This scenario could easily be avoided by having the correct administrative 
procedures in place.   
With regards to the DoS attacks detailed in Section 2 Literature Review, alternative 
emerging secure methods for avoiding loops within the network such as Transparent 
Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL), Shortest Path Bridging (SPB) and Software Defined 
Networking (SDN) could be employed as an alternative to STP in order to mitigate for the 
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various flooding and topology engagement attacks identified. Otherwise a number of 
mitigation techniques are detailed within the Section 2 Literature Review which could used 
in order to make STP more secure.    
6.2. Discovery of Network Topology 
It was noted that the root switch provides the least amount of information with regards to 
network topology on a stable network as a result of having designated ports only. This 
means that no information with regards switches connected to this device can be obtained 
as all configuration BPDUs originate here without information such as bridge ID or root path 
cost being updated. On an unstable network information with regards to the root ports of 
connected devices can be obtained via the source address of a TCN packet.  
Non-root switches provide more information as a result of information they receive via their 
root port. This is where a configuration BPDU is received from a switch with a higher priority 
value and updates fields within its own configuration BPDUs, namely bridge ID and root path 
cost, which are forwarded from its designated ports to switches which have a lower priority 
on the network.   
When a monitored switch provides information with regards to more than three bridge IDs, 
this switch is receiving configuration BPDUs via two of its ports. This indicates that the 
switch has a non-designated/blocked port, which can be identified finding equal root path 
costs and then calculating the lower bridge priority by finding the lowest bridge ID.   
If combined with TCAs, TCNs can provide information with regards to the segments used on 
a LAN. This is achieved by using the TCN source address indicating the root port by which 
the TCN was sent, with the TCA source address indicating the designated port of the switch 
receiving the TCN. If two TCNs are received in succession then the last TCN is to be used in 
this way, with the first TCN relating to the root port of a switch of lower priority connected 
to the monitored switch.  
When TCAs are sent from the root switch using the topology change bit/flag no real 
topology information is given as this is sent via configuration BPDUs indicating to all 
receiving switches that the default aging time for their MAC tables should be changed from 
the default of 300 seconds to its forward delay with a default value of 15 seconds.   
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In order to accurately identify the network topology STP information from multiple switches 
is required; this was shown by the amalgamation of the data obtained in the tables detailing 
information with regards to stable and unstable networks in Section 5 Script Development. 
This is also verified by a prior study  showing  how the physical topology of a network can be 
established using the Spanning Tree Protocol by obtaining STP information of all switches' 
ports in Management Information Base (MIB) using SNMP (HePeng PanHeng et al., 2010) 
6.3. Future Work 
Further study and development of the script is required in order to make it fully object 
orientated. Secure coding guidelines with regards to python would also need to be 
investigated and the code re-factored in accordance to these guidelines.  
 
Sudo privileges are required when running the test scripts which provides some security 
with regards to its use on the administrative PC, although as the file is left unencrypted on 
the administrators desktop this would allow for its abstraction and use on a PC controlled by 
a would be attacker.  In order to provide extra security the administrator could use 
Cryptkeeper (Pot, 2011) or eCryptfs (eCryptfs.org, 2015) to encrypt the python folder 
located on the desktop.  
  
As all testing was carried out in a virtual network, further tests would be required within an 
enterprise environment in order to identify if it functions correctly and to ascertain if it has 
any value as part of a security audit of the network.  
 
As a result of BRCTL currently complementing ANSI/IEEE802.1D and with plans for future 
enhancements including RSTP 802.1W, further research with regards to the establishment 
of network topology using the enhanced BRCTL completing IEEE802.1W should be carried 
out when it is released.  
 
As a result of the works carried out the author believes that the tools and techniques used 
could form the basis for a diagnostic tool for STP, which could be used to identify faulty or 
disabled interfaces on the network.  
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Appendix A - configuration of network adapter using vboxmanage.exe 
 
 
ii 
 
The fifth network Adapter for Switch1 can be enabled/configured for an Internal Network using the following vboxmanage commands: 
1. To enable the fifth network adapter on Switch1 for an internal network named test_network1 
 
2. To enable VMs Promiscuous mode  
 
3. Use other hardware type (Intel Pro/1000 MT Server) 
 
4. Disconnect cable 
 
5. Connect cable 
 
 
 Note "Adapter 5", a fifth network adapter has now been added to Switch
C:\Users\User>vboxmanage modifyvm Switch1 --cableconnected5 on 
C:\Users\User>vboxmanage modifyvm Switch1 --cableconnected5 off 
C:\Users\User>vboxmanage modifyvm Switch1 --nictype5 82545EM 
C:\Users\User>vboxmanage modifyvm Switch1 --nicpromisc5 allow-all 
C:\Users\User>vboxmanage modifyvm Switch1 --nic5 intnet  
C:\Users\User>vboxmanage modifyvm Switch1 --intnet5 "test_network1" 
 
 iii 
 
Appendix B - SSH set-up between administrative PC and network switch  
  
 
 
iv 
 
This example illustrates the setup of a SSH password-less automatic login from PC1 (192.168.2.200) as user root to Switch4 (192.168.2.24) with 
user root. 
Step1: Install OpenSSH on the PC1 
 
Step 2: Create Authentication SSH-Kegen Keys on PC1 (192.168.2.200) 
First login into PC1 (192.168.2.200) with user root and generate a pair of public keys.  
 v 
 
 
Step 3: Create .ssh Directory on Switch4 (192.168.2.24) 
Use SSH from PC1 (192.168.2.200) to connect to Switch4 (192.168.2.24) using root as user and create .ssh directory under it. 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: Upload Generated Public Keys to Switch4 (192.168.2.24) 
Use SSH from PC1 (192.168.2.200) and upload new generated public key (id_rsa.pub) on Switch4 (192.168.2.24) under root's .ssh directory as a 
file name authorized_keys. 
 
Step 5: Set Permissions on Switch4 (192.168.2.24) 
Due to different SSH versions on servers, we need to set permissions on .ssh directory and authorized_keys file. 
 vii 
 
 
Step 6: Login from PC1 (192.168.2.200) to Switch4 (192.168.2.24) without Password 
 
From now onwards you can log into Switch4 as root user  from server PC1 as root user without a password.(Saive, 2012) 
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Appendix C - network switch configuration using BRCTL 
  
 ix 
 
This procedure was used in order to setup Switch1 on the CentOS 6.6 minimal Install using BRCTL 
1. Install all needed packages: 
        
 
2. Disable NetworkManager and enable network at boot time: 
 
3. Create br0 configuration 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#vi /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts /ifcfg-br0 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#chkconfig NetworkManager off 
[root @Switch1 ~]#chkconfig –levels 35 network on 
[root @Switch1 ~]#/etc/init.d/NetworkManager stop 
[root @Switch1 ~]#/etc/init.d/network restart 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#yum install bridge-utils 
[root @Switch1 ~]#yum install tunctl 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
4. Create eth1,eth2,eth3,eth4 configuration 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#vi /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts /ifcfg-eth1 
 
DEVICE=br0 
TYPE=Bridge 
BOOTPROTO=static 
ONBOOT=yes 
STP =on 
IPADDR=192.168.2.21 
NETMASK=255.255.255.255 
NETWORK=192.168.2.0 
GATEWAY=0.0.0.0 
 xi 
 
 
 
 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#vi /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts /ifcfg-eth3 
DEVICE=eth2 
HWADDR=08:00:27:E3:15:33 
TYPE=ethernet 
BOOTPROTO=static 
ONBOOT=yes 
BRIDGE=br0 
IPV6INIT=no 
USERCTL=no 
 
GATEWAY=0.0.0.0 
[root @Switch1 ~]#vi /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts /ifcfg-eth2 
 
DEVICE=eth1 
HWADDR=08:00:27:04:1A:20 
TYPE=ethernet 
BOOTPROTO=static 
ONBOOT=yes 
BRIDGE=br0 
IPV6INIT=no 
USERCTL=no 
GATEWAY=0.0.0.0 
 
 
xii 
 
 
 
 
5. Restart network or reboot machine 
DEVICE=eth4 
HWADDR=08:00:27:9B:123:9B 
TYPE=ethernet 
BOOTPROTO=static 
ONBOOT=yes 
BRIDGE=br0 
IPV6INIT=no 
USERCTL=no 
 
GATEWAY=0.0.0.0 
[root @Switch1 ~]#vi /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts /ifcfg-eth4 
 
DEVICE=eth3 
HWADDR=08:00:27:D9:4F:16 
TYPE=ethernet 
BOOTPROTO=static 
ONBOOT=yes 
BRIDGE=br0 
IPV6INIT=no 
USERCTL=no 
 
GATEWAY=0.0.0.0 
 xiii 
 
 
 
6. Enable Spanning Tree Protocol 
In order to enable and ensure that Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is on the following BRCTL commands are used: 
 
 
You can see the STP parameters by entering the following: 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#brctl showstp br0 
 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]# brctl stp br0 on 
[root @Switch1 ~]#brctl show br0 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#reboot 
 
[root @Switch1 ~]#/etc/init.d/network restart 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
 
 xv 
 
There are a number of parameters related to the STP that can be configured. It is important to note that the code auto detects the speed of 
the link and other parameters, so these usually don't need to be changed. For the purposes of this project the bridge priority of each switch 
has been left as the default value meaning the lowest MAC address determines the root bridge on this network.  
7. Port mirroring  
The mirrored port is enabled by running script within the "/etc/rc.local" folder of the CentOS Linux OS.  
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Appendix D - python script run on a stable network with no TCNs or TCAs 
  
 
 
xviii 
 
 
 Script run on PC1/Switch1 - Stable Network 
 
 xix 
 
 
Script run on PC3/Switch2 - Stable Network 
 
 
xx 
 
 
Script run on PC4/Switch3 -Stable Network 
 xxi 
 
 
Script run on PC5/Switch4 - Stable Network 
 
 
xxii 
 
Appendix E - python script run on an unstable network with TCNs and TCAs 
 
  
 xxiii 
 
Test 1 Switch 3 eth1 down (In this test adapter 7a:aa:35 is taken down on Switch 3.)  
 
 (Test1) Script PC1/Switch1 - Unstable Network  
 
 
xxiv 
 
 
 (Test1) Script PC3/Switch2 - Unstable Network 
 xxv 
 
 
(Test1) Script PC4/Switch3 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xxvi 
 
 
(Test1) Script PC5/Switch4 -Unstable Network 
  
 xxvii 
 
Test 2 Switch 3 eth1 up (In this test adapter 7a:aa:35 is taken up on Switch 3).  
 
(Test2) Script PC1/Switch1 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xxviii 
 
 
(Test2) Script PC3/Switch2 - Unstable Network 
 xxix 
 
 
(Test2) Script PC4/Switch3 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
(Test2) Script PC5/Switch4 - Unstable Network 
  
 xxxi 
 
Test 3 Switch 2 eth1 down (In this test adapter 57:3c:3a is taken down on Switch 2).  
 
(Test3) Script PC1/Switch1 -Unstable Network 
 
 
xxxii 
 
 
(Test3) Script PC3/Switch2 -Unstable Network 
 xxxiii 
 
 
(Test3) Script PC4/Switch3 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xxxiv 
 
 
(Test3) Script PC5/Switch4 - Unstable Network 
  
 xxxv 
 
Test 4 Switch 2 eth1 up (In this test adapter 57:3c:3a is taken up on Switch 2) 
 
(Test4) Script PC1/Switch1 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xxxvi 
 
 
 
 (Test4) Script PC3/Switch2 - Unstable Network 
 xxxvii 
 
 
 (Test4) Script PC4/Switch3 -Unstable Network 
 
 
 
xxxviii 
 
 
 (Test4) Script PC5/Switch4 - Unstable Network 
  
 xxxix 
 
Test 5 Switch 3 eth2 down (In this test adapter 9b:fc:27 is taken down on Switch 3) 
 
 (Test5) Script PC1/Switch1 -Unstable Network 
 
 
xl 
 
 
 
 (Test5) Script PC3/Switch2 - Unstable Network 
 xli 
 
 
 
 (Test5) Script PC4/Switch3 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xlii 
 
 
 
 (Test5) Script PC5/Switch4 - Unstable Network 
 xliii 
 
Test 6 Switch 3 eth2 up (In this test adapter 9b:fc:27 is taken up on Switch 3 ) 
 
 (Test6) Script PC1/Switch1 - Unstable Network 
 
 
xliv 
 
 
 
 (Test6) Script PC3/Switch2 - Unstable Network 
 xlv 
 
 
 (Test6) Script PC4/Switch3 - Unstable Network 
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 (Test6) Script PC5/Switch4 - Unstable Network
 
